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FOREWORD

BEYOND EQUALITY:
POWER AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FREEDOM
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE
Angela P. Harrist
INTRODUCTION: My name is Martha Fineman and I have the
distinct honor and privilege of presenting to you Professor Angela
Harris, who is going to do our keynote address.
Angela Harris is a Professor of Law at the University of California
at Berkeley. She writes in the fields of feminist theory and critical race
theory. Several of her articles are being included in many anthologies. In fact, my students this year benefitted greatly from reading her
preeminent article, which she published in 1990, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory.1 We learned a great deal in discussing that
article.
Her recent book projects include Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine
and Commentary, and she published this with Katharine Bartlett.2 She
also produced Race and Racism: Cases and Resources for a Diverse
America,3 coming out soon we hope. Also I want to mention that her
article examining the past century of race law will be published by the
California Law Review for its millennium issue. So we have a lot to
look forward to in addition to this talk this afternoon.
As I said, it's my great pleasure to introduce Professor Angela
Harris. I have admired her work for a long time and learned a great
deal from reading her, and I expect that today her presentation on
Beyond Equality:Powerand the Possibility ofFreedom in the Republic of Choice
will further enlighten us all.
MS. HARRIS: Thank you for that gracious introduction,
Martha, and I want to give Martha Fineman extra thanks for making
sure that I got invited to this conference and could come back to Ithaca. And I want to thank the conference organizers for honoring me,
t

Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN'. L. REv. 581
(1990).
2 KATHARiNE T. BA Tzrr & ANGELA P. HARIs, GENDrR AN LAw: THEoRY, DocTRmN,
CommENTARY (2d ed. 1998).
3

JuAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACS: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA

(West Group 2000).
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by inviting me to make this address. It really is a wonderful, wonderfil honor.
I also want to give special thanks to Courtney Tedrowe for setting
up baby-sitting for me so that I could participate in the conference
today; Erin Stauffer for doing the baby-sitting; and Kathy Abrams for
providing a house for the babysitting. I ate a fortune cookie last week,
and the cookie had two different fortunes in it, but both of them said
exactly the same thing, so I figured it was probably a sign. And both
of the fortunes said "behind every able man is another able man."
Interpreting this in a gender-inclusive way, I took this to mean that no
one's accomplishments occur in a vacuum, and child care is one of
those humble accomplishments that takes an enormous amount of
labor-of woman power particularly-and usually ends up being totally invisible. So I want to thank you all for making the institutional
arrangements that enabled my freedom today.
So the tile of my talk is Beyond Equality: Powerand the Possibility of
Freedom in the Republic of Choice, and I want to say, first to give my disclaimers, that I'm very much at the beginning stages of thinking about
this. So I appreciate in advance your willingness to go into my somewhat rambling presentation to think these things through with me.
And I'm especially glad Linda McClain is here because it sounds like
she's already begun to think more deeply about some of the things
that I've just started to get to. So I'm excited about the discussion
we'll have afterwards.
In Saenz v. Roe,4 decided on May 17, 1999, the U.S. Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a California statute that limited the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived California residents to
the amount payable by the state of the recipient's prior residence. 5
The Court's holding wasn't surprising given its previous opinions on
welfare benefits and the right to travel. Some of you who are students
may have read Shapiro v. Thompson,6 which is one of those cases. What
was surprising in Saenz was the way the Court described the source of
the constitutional right. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated
that the California statute was unconstitutional because it abridged
the right of a newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same state. 7 In other words, the
Court founded its holding on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
8
the 14th Amendment.
4

5
6

7
8

526 U.S. 489 (1999).
See id. at 511.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-06.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Now it's interesting that this case should be decided in 1999 on
the eve of the new century. It was in 1873, thirty years before the
dawn of the present century, that the Supreme Court killed off the
14th Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause in the notorious
Slaughter-HouseCases.9 As I'm sure you all know, the 14th Amendment
provides that "[n] o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." 10 And the purpose of the 14th Amendment was to ensure that
the natural, civil, and political rights of the individual would be within
the power of the national government to protect.
At a deeper level, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was about
freedom: specifically, the freedom of six million or so people of African descent. The Reconstruction Congress was aware that the southern states were attempting to reestablish slavery both through active
state action, as with the Black Codes," and by simply failing to protect
black peoples' rights. The civil rights to own property, to make and
enforce contracts, to appear in court, and even the natural right to
make a living were being endangered by private violence and terror,
and the states were failing to do anything about it. By making it clear
that the national government had the authority to protect the natural
and civil rights of the freed slaves, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
would provide federal legal protection to those rights where state legal
protection did not exist.
And the language in the Privileges or Immunities Clause required
the courts to think about and specify these natural, political, and civil
rights. What rights were inherent to being a citizen of the United
States? At the time, of course, there was already a rich existing literature on natural rights and other kinds of rights.'2 So the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was an exercise in considering the relevance of
that literature to the project of emancipation. At an abstract level, the
language in the Privileges or Immunities Clause required the courts to
think about the institutional conditions precedent for freedom. What
is freedom? What kinds of protections, what kinds of institutional arrangements, what kinds of social structures are necessary to facilitate
3
freedom?'
9 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (Walter L. Fleming ed.,
1906).
12 See WiLuIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. FROM POLrTcAL PRINCIPLE
To JUDiCwIL DocruNE 13-39 (1988) (describing ideas about liberty, equality, and federalism in political discourse around the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted).

13 See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrectingthe PrivilegesorImmunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner. Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1996) ("A look at text, context, history, ethical aspirations,
precedent and constitutional structure suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi-
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As we know, though, and as both the majority and dissent in Saenz
recognized, this jurisprudence was killed off by a hostile Supreme
Court before it ever really began. The holding of the Slaughter-House
Cases in 1873 was that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
protect the natural and civil rights of the individual, for these rights
were granted to the states to protect. Rather, the privileges and immunities of national citizenship consisted only of specifically federal
rights, like the right to travel interstate or to petition the federal government for the redress of grievances. 14 The practical effect of this
holding was to turn the Privileges or Immunities Clause into a historical curiosity-at least until May of 1999. The jurisprudential effect of
the Slaughter-HouseCaseswas to usher in a century that we're now leaving: a century of American jurisprudence in which equal protection,
and not privileges and immunities, has been the touchstone of the
oppressed. The post-Reconstruction Supreme Court killed off the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but it left more or less intact the
Equal Protection Clause. And ever since the revival of civil rights activism in the 1940s, the Equal Protection Clause has been at the center
of almost every legal effort by subordinated groups to challenge their
subordination.
So that's the wind-up for telling you what I want to talk about
today. I want to remind us first of the road not taken: the road not
taken because the Supreme Court knocked a big tree across the path.
And then I want to say a couple of words and, upon saying them, see
how we might think differently if we were able to leave the language of
equality aside for a bit. Those words are freedom and class. Now,
they're dangerous words, and I'll acknowledge some of those dangers
in a minute, but I think that they're worth exploring.
What I'm not going to do is unveil to you a new jurisprudence
based on Saenz. I'm not at all sure such a jurisprudence is possibleor even to be wished for by progressives. 15 I would guess, rather, that
equality is going to be the only legal game in town for quite a while.
But because it's 1999 and I feel the irresistible urge to be millennial,
and because we, as critical theorists, have spent a long time now exploring the nooks and crannies of equality, as well as equality's limitations, I thought it might be useful just to imagine a little bit. Imagine
what it would be like if we weren't trapped inside the box of equality.
leges or Immunities Clause was designed to make the Constitution what its preamble
promised-a guarantee of liberty.").
14 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77-78.
15 As Michael Curtis has noted, many of those who responded with delight when the
Court decided Saenz were right-wing activists hoping for a return to judicial activism on
behalf of liberty of contract and traditional property rights. See Curtis, supranote 13, at 2
(describing interest of free-market foundation in Saenz).
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First a little bit about that box of equality. The discourse of
equality, as we've all come to realize, is both powerful and constraining. Consider, for example, the language of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866,16 a statute that survived the Supreme Court's assault during
the Reconstruction period. The 1866 Act, which is now embodied in
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, declares that all citizens of the United States
shall, without regard to color, have the same right to contract, sue,
give evidence, take, hold, and convey property, and to the equal benefit of all laws for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens. 17 Now, this has been a powerful tool for a group of
people who were formerly property. It also became a tool not only for
African Americans, but for Latinos and Latinas, Jews, "gypsies," and all
persons from the groups that the nineteenth-century drafters under8
stood to be races.'
But the statute has its limitations as well, and as many of you have
pointed out for some years now, the language of equality in general
has some serious problems.' 9 First, it preserves white citizens and the
rights that they have in stone. The measure of what other people get
is what white citizens get, and the rights that white citizens have are
the only rights that are protected. Thus, whiteness remains an unexamined norm.20 Second, the language of equality draws us into the
long and vexed debate about difference. You're only entitled to
equality if you are similarly situated-if you're exactly like a white citizen, only not white. But what if you're not similarly situated? Do you
get the "same" treatment, or are you entitled to "different" treatment?
Is different treatment equality or is that special treatment? The sameness/difference debate obscures questions of power;2 ' it also tends to
mask the recognition that "sameness" and "difference" are relational,
22
not absolute, concepts.
Third, the language of equality has drawn us into a long debate
over which differences are natural or immutable or rooted in biology,
16
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982 (1994)).

17
18

See id.

See Saint Francis

College v. Al-Khazraji,

481 U.S.

604,

612-13 (1987) (for purposes

of § 1981, nineteenth century rather than twentieth century conceptions of race control);
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) (same analysis for § 1982
claim).
19 For a classic critique of equality discourse as obscuring issues of power and subordination, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 218

(1989) (criticizing sameness/difference discourse because it masks relations of power).
20 This represents a "discrimination" as opposed to "privilege" model of equality. See
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN Er AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDER-

MINES AMEiCA 27-30 (1996).
21 See MAcKINNON, supra note 19, at 218.
22 See MARIA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENE 52 (1990) (noting that difference
is "relational, not intrinsic").
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and which differences are a mere matter of "choice," which means
that they're presumptively unprotected. So what is gay and lesbian
sexuality, for instance? Is it a mere life-style choice? Is it embedded in
our genes and hence immutable? 23 Why do we have to engage in this
debate at all? Because the logic of equality has taken us there.
Fourth, the language of equality has drawn us into a long debate
over the essential character of groups rather than into how those
groups are treated. For example, the lower courts spent a long time
floundering when Latinos wanted to use §§ 1981 and 1982 to protect
themselves from discrimination. Are Latinos and Latinas a race?
What constitutes a race? That became the question that was asked
and answered instead of the question, do these groups suffer from
certain forms of discrimination that we associate with color
24
prejudice?
Above all, the language of equality seduces us away from the realities of social power, and into an imaginary land where groups of people can be laid side by side to see if they're similarly situated, and then
they can be made equal. Equality discourse, then, inherently brings
us into a vexed relationship with history.
So at the end of the millennium, some people are thinking that
the rhetoric of equality has been exhausted and they're looking
around for alternatives. Linda McClain, for example, is working on a
25 I
project about the material preconditions for self-government.
want to encourage all of us to think about those issues as well. But
how I get there is through a couple of words: freedom and class. So
let me talk about those words, first acknowledging their dangers and
then making a pitch for their potential.
The dangers of the rhetoric of freedom are obvious. Freedom in
this society officially means negative freedom, not positive freedom.
Freedom from something rather than freedom to do something.
More specifically, in contemporary political life, equality is "our"
word. Freedom is "their" word: a conservative word. Freedom stands
for economic laissez-faire: what's good for Microsoft is good for
America, free markets unhindered by inefficient social welfare programs. Quickly now: Freedom from political correctness, government
off our backs, no new taxes. I agree with Linda McClain that this thin
23
SeeJanet E. Halley, Sexual Orientationand the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994).
24 See Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination,

and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L.

REv.

662 (1975); see alsoAlex M. Saragoza et al.,

History and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the Hispanic Classification,5 LA RA A LJ. 1

(1992).
25
See Linda C. McClain, Toward a FormativeProject of SecuringFreedom and Equality, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1221 (2000).
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conception of freedom is not all there is within real liberalism, but the
thin conception does have an extremely potent political force.
More deeply, the rhetoric of freedom, specifically freedom of
choice, is the standard American rhetoric used to obscure injustice
itself. As Joan Williams has argued, for example, the language of a
woman's choice is used to make invisible the constraints of our sex/
gender system.2 6 You can work a million hours a week and never see
your kids, or you can quit your interesting, challengingjob and stay at
home with those kids for twenty years. Congratulations, it's your
choice. The language of choice is also used to make invisible the constraints of life under capitalism. This message is familiar to us from
consumer society. We have five hundred television channels. Isn't
that great? We have more choice than ever before! You can have
Pepsi, Coke, Cherry Coke, Classic Coke, R.C. Cola, Jolt, Pepsi One,
Storm, Diet Coke, or caffeine-free Diet Coke. So what if they're all
based on the same formula and the same two companies own them
all? You get to make a choice. Aren't you glad you live in America?
So freedom is a dangerous word. And let me also say something
about the dangers of my other word, class. Class often gets raised in
the context of debates about identity politics and it usually comes up
in one of two ways. First, class is often used as a rhetorical club with
which to beat identity politicians over the head. The idea is that the
politics of racial, sexual, and gender identity is divisive and alienating,
whereas the politics of class is unifying and has mass appeal. Therefore, the reason why the revolution hasn't happened in the United
States is that the women all became women's libbers, that the black
people all became Panthers, and then the gay people had to have
their own movement, too. And then we experienced the disuniting of
America, to use Arthur Schlesinger's term.2 7 That's one way in which
the rhetoric of class is used.
The second way that class rhetoric can be dangerous in progressive debates is when it's used within the equality framework as a tool
for winning the oppression sweepstakes. Here we emphasize that
growing up poor or working class in this country brings with it a kind
of personal suffering that is similar to the suffering of people of color,
or gay or lesbian people, yet Americans are unwilling to pay much
attention to this kind of suffering. I'm open to that part of the argument, but it often gets turned into the competitive argument that affirmative action, for example, should be abolished because AfricanAmerican middle-class kids are actually just as privileged or more priv26

See JoAN WILuis, UNBENDING GENDER:

WHY

FAMILY AND WORK CoNFuCT AND

WHAT TO Do ABour IT (2000); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of
Choice 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559 (1991).
27 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., THE DisuNrnNG oF AMERIcA (1998).
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ileged than working-class white kids. And this draws us into a longsuffering competition about who is more of a victim.
So I know that these words and the rhetoric they invoke are dangerous, but what I want to do is set aside for a moment the roles these
words play in the rhetoric of equality and consider them within the
framework of privileges and immunities. To return to that framework, what are the institutional conditions of freedom? I want to suggest that both the question of institutional conditions and the idea of
freedom allow us to transform the problem of class into the problem
of capitalism, which is in dire need of effective critique these days.
What are the economic institutional conditions under which we
live today? Here is one relevant quotation:
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products
chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions
everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption
in every country.... All old-established national industries have
been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by
new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up
indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest
zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home,
but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied
by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for
their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place
of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have
intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The
intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more
and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local
28
literatures, there arises a world literature.
You might think this is a description of the new globalization. In fact,
these paragraphs were first published in London, in February 1848.
That was an excerpt from an essay by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
called the Manifesto of the Communist Party.2 9 If you've never read it

before, you might be surprised that Marx and Engels devoted a lot of
the essay to description, describing the processes of creative destruction that we associate with capitalism. And as the quote I read suggests, they're aware of both the standard and the subversive benefits
28

Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in KARL MARX AND

FREDERICK ENGELS: SELEGTED WORKS 38-39 (International Publishers

29

See id.

1972) (1848).
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and possibilities of capitalism. They understand, for example, that
capitalism has made possible a higher standard of living than you
could ever have imagined for human beings before its invention.
They understand that capitalism works because it brings us stuff that
we want and stuff that we need.
They also understand that the cycles of capitalist production and
consumption create new relationships of interdependence among nations and regions of the world. We've been talking about this a lot in
left contemporary discourse, about the fact that global businesses and
global cultural practices don't stand a chance against corporate
money and the glamour of first world consumption patterns. We've
also been talking about this a lot on the production side. As soon as
workers in one country start demanding a living wage, then production moves to a poorer country where workers can't demand quite so
much.
But Marx and Engels also recognized some of the beneficial possibilities of capitalism. Consider the last part of the quote again, that
the intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. As Marshall Berman suggests, if we replace the word "literature"
with the world "culture" in the quote, we have an even more powerful
idea.30 As he puts it, what a world culture means is that
history slips through the owner's fingers. So that poor people get to
possess culture-an idea, a poetic image, a musical sound, Plato,
Shakespeare, a Negro spiritual... even if they can't own it. Culture
stuffs people's heads full of ideas. As a form of "common property,"
modern culture helps us to imagine how people all around the
3
world could share all the world's resources someday. '
So capitalism has made it possible not only to buy the world a Coke,
but it's also made possible Subcomandante Marcos in Chiapas using
pop culture, high culture and post-modern irony to resist oppression-and a following around the planet via the Internet.
So why worry? We're constantly being told about the wonders of
American-style capitalism. The American economy is booming, inflation and unemployment are both low. Everyone can invest in the
stock market and become rich. The Internet is going to bring us new
forms of democracy, more freedom than has ever been possible
before, and it's going to make a lot of people very wealthy. In fact, we
go to other countries like Russia and tell them how to run their economic systems so that they can be like us. The Cold War is over and
Marx's side lost.

SO
31

Marshall Berman, UnchainedMelody, THE NATION, May 11, 1998, at 11.
1& at 15.
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Well, one obvious answer might be inequality. Inequality is not
just an accidental byproduct of capitalism. It's capitalism's major
product. And in contemporary America, that inequality seems to be
increasing. The richest Americans keep getting an increasing share of
the nation's wealth, while the rest of us are competing for an ever
smaller share of the pie. The good news for welfare reform seems to
be that more people are actually entering the workforce than anyone
thought possible, but the bad news is that their salaries put them below the poverty line. And we know that more and more people are
going without health insurance or benefits.3 2 So that's one way to answer the claim that capitalism is a good system: an answer phrased in
terms of equality. But we can also phrase an answer in terms of
freedom.
There's a way in which under existing capitalism, capitalism as we
experience it from day to day, provides the motor for the disciplinary
exercise of power. And here I'm using discipline in Foucault's sense.
Capitalism, and here I mean not just market work, but also the structure of social norms that currently existing capitalism perpetuates, encourages us all to regulate ourselves, to subject ourselves to the
discipline of the free market. This becomes the motor for the negotiation of identity that Devon Carbado was telling us about.3 3 And we
should use the word "negotiation" advisedly because one of the conditions of currently existing capitalism is that one's opportunity to bargain with one's employer about the basic terms and conditions of
one's work is extremely limited. Again, as Marshall Berman puts it:
The crucial reality is the need to sell your labor to capital in order
to live; the need to carve up your personality for sale-to look at
yourself in the mirror and think, "What have I got that I can sell?"and an unending dread and anxiety, that even if you're O.K. today,
you won't find anyone who wants to buy what you have or what you
are tomorrow, that the changing market will declare you (as it has
already declared so many) worthless, that you will find yourself phys34
ically as well as metaphysically homeless and out in the cold.
Those of you who are students and are participating in interviews for
jobs well know about this process of self-discipline and discipline by
the market. The unrelenting discipline of the market becomes our
own internal self-discipline, and is marketed to us in the language of
choice, consent and negotiation. This, I think, is part of the reason
why we Americans are so deeply resentful of people like welfare moms
32
See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in ConstitutionalPerspective,
82 ComNrr. L. REv. 523 (1997).
33
See Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CoRNn. L. REv. 1259

(2000).
34

Berman, supra note 30, at 15-16.
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who seem to be getting a ticket out. I think, and here I'm borrowing
from William Connelly, that the ceaseless self-discipline of actually existing capitalism fuels our resentment and our willingness to impose
harsh standards of responsibility on vulnerable others.3 5 In the republic of choice, we're all responsible for ourselves. We're responsible for
every choice we make, no matter how deeply constrained those
choices are, and we're taught to understand the responsibility of that
choice as freedom. Yet we feel that responsibility as oppressive. We
are free, yet everywhere in chains.
So one thing I want to suggest is we can think about these issues
within the rhetoric of equality, but we might try thinking about them
in the rhetoric of freedom. Is this freedom-not just the pressures
that are placed upon us from the outside, the need to sell our labor
power to someone to survive, but the disciplines that we impose on
ourselves, the practices of self-surveillance, self-promotion, self-discipline, in order to fit ourselves within the rules that capitalism sets? If
this is not freedom, what might freedom look like? What might be the
institutional conditions of freedom? Which brings us back to the privileges and immunities of national citizenship.
Now, I do have a warning as we think about the privileges and
immunities of citizenship which is about the other part of that phrase:
the "citizenship" part. There is, as Linda McGlain mentions, a lot of
thoughtful work, including the civic republican literature, that tries to
steer us towards thinking about the material preconditions of self-government.3 6 But I think we have to examine those projects carefully
before we sign on to them. One caution which Professor McClain
articulated earlier is that we should worry about to what extent the
notion of a republican citizen, the yeoman farmer, or the heroic artisan is actually a heterosexual male, and I think we're absolutely right
to be worried about this. And I would add another caution to what
she said. I wonder to what extent these projects of fostering citizenship and self-government are really trading on nineteenth-century notions of self-government that fail to take actually existing
contemporary capitalism into account. And here I'm worried about
both the production side and the consumption side of capitalism. On
the production side, it seems to me that the classic notion of the deliberative citizen who exercises self-government may be based on a kind
of pre-industrial conception of the property holder who can be politically independent and autonomous and deliberative, precisely because he is economically autonomous. In contrast, you might wonder
who the self-governing citizen is in the economic universe that Marx
describes and that, I have suggested, Foucault describes as well. In35
36

See, e.g., Wxm M E. CONNOL.Y,IDEN T/DFFERENCE 21-22 (1991).
See McClain, supra note 25, at 1224.
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deed, some recent economic developments such as GATT and the
power of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, suggest that states themselves are losing power vis-a-vis financial markets. What exactly will be left of the state by the time
we've constructed our deliberative citizens?
On the consumption side, and this is a point that Dan Ortiz is
making in a paper he's working on,37 we live in a world that has been
deeply shaped for generations now on choice as consumption and
consumption as choice. To what extent, again, does our image of national citizenship and sturdy self-reliance, of self-governance, fail to
take into account a world in which choice really means choosing between "less filling" and "tastes great?"
All right. So the point of this talk is really to engage in a thought
experiment, to leave behind for a moment the pressing important
questions of what equality is and how to achieve it, and to think about
human flourishing within a different rhetoric, the rhetoric of freedom. And the point's been, of course, that equality enables some debates and disables others. The lasting tragedy of the Slaughter-House
Cases is that we, as identity politicians, could have had both in our
constitutional discourse: both the language of equal protection and the
language of privileges or immunities. It's possible that Saenz suggests
that someday in the coming century we will have both. It's also true
that with work, some existing resources may take us there. I agree
that projects such as Martha Fineman's use of the existing law of sex
discrimination move in the right direction. Others have argued that
international human rights law gives us some tools. But for now, Ijust
want to leave you with a quote from the Old Man again:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production,
and with them the whole relations of society....

All fixed, fast-

frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face
with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with
8
his kind.3
Who are we really and how are we living really? How do we want
to live in our ideal society? How can we get there? The rhetoric of
equality can take us part of the way but not the whole way. I want to
urge us as progressive people to begin colonizing the discourse of
freedom and, as you do so, look back and remember those people for
whom this discourse of freedom was initially crafted.
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But as we do so, we also have to keep our eyes set on actually
existing capitalism, and we have to apply the lessons of critical theory
about power. It's not just a matter of the workers versus the capitalists. As Marx pointed out, it's also the way in which capitalism shapes
who we become and what our dreams are; which avenues for agency
are open, and which are foreclosed. Thank you.

